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Abstract Within the class of zero-monotonic and grand coalition superadditive4
cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is character-5
ized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence6
it is proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core7
of a game and the modified Zhou bargaining set a` la Shimomura.8
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2 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
1 Introduction10
Cooperative game theory analyzes how to distribute profits arising from the coop-11
eration of a group of agents by proposing solutions that may consist on a unique12
allocation of those profits (payoff vector) or on a group of them meeting some13
stability conditions (set-solution). The core of a game v, C(N, v), is the most nat-14
ural set-solution concept but it might be empty. The bargaining sets (Davis and15
Maschler (1963, 1967), Mas-Colell (1989), Zhou (1994) and others) based on ob-16
jections and counter-objections to payoff proposals offer an alternative solution to17
the emptiness of the core, at a cost to be rather complex to compute. For this18
reason, it has been interesting to define non-empty subsolutions of the bargaining19
sets that were more simply to describe and check, that fulfill some stability con-20
ditions and that were related to the core of the game whenever it is non-empty.21
In this way, the first subsolutions we can find in the literature are the notion of22
quasi-core, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1966), and the concept of kernel23
of a game (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Years after, Shimomura (1997) introduces24
the steady bargaining set of a game v, SB(N, v), and a small modification of the25
Shapley and Shubik quasi-core concept. The steady bargaining set of a game in-26
cludes its core and it is a subsolution of two well-known variants of bargaining27
sets, also introduced by Shimomura (1997): the modified Mas-Colell bargaining28
set, MB∗(N, v), and the modified Zhou bargaining set, Z∗(N,v). The relationship29
among these solutions is as follows:30
C(N, v) ⊆ SB(N,v) ⊆ Z∗(N, v) ⊆MB∗(N, v). (1)
A sufficient condition that guarantees the non-emptiness of the steady bar-31
gaining set and the modified Zhou bargaining set of a game is its grand coalition32
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 3
superadditivity, while grand coalition zero-monotonicity also suffices to check the33
non-emptiness of the modified Mas-Colell bargaining set.34
Convex or supermodular coalitional games were introduced by Shapley (1971).35
They are an important subclass of games and they model cooperative situations36
where the marginal contribution of a player to a coalition increases as the coalition37
becomes larger (the so called snowballing effect). Convex games satisfy impor-38
tant properties from a game theoretical point of view and they have been useful39
to analyze and capture many economic situations both in cooperative and non-40
cooperative frameworks.41
Einy and Wettstein (1996) opened the question of characterizing the convexity42
of a game by comparing its bargaining sets with the core, with special reference43
to the stable bargaining set introduced by Greenberg (1992). Within the domain44
of zero-monotonic games, Izquierdo and Rafels (2012) give a first answer to that45
question by means of the coincidence of the core of a game and its modified Mas-46
Colell bargaining set.47
In this paper we focus on enriching the convexity characterization results.48
Within the domain of zero-monotonic and grand coalition superadditive games,49
the first characterization requires the coincidence of the the core of a game and its50
steady bargaining set (Theorem 1). The elaborate proof of our new characterization51
of the convexity of a game follows a two-step argument: first (see Proposition 1) ,52
we show the characterization within a subclass of almost-convex games (introduced53
by Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 1998); second, in Theorem 1, we tackle the general case.54
Finally, by the inclusion relationship given in (1), we also obtain as a corollary55
of this theorem an additional new characterization of convex games in term of the56
coincidence of the modified Zhou bargaining set and the core of the game (Corol-57
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4 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
lary 1). We expect this work might serve to both obtain new equivalence theorems58
and to reanalyze the different convexity notions given for the non-transferable59
utility case.60
2 Notations61
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of players. For any coalition S ⊆ N , |S| denotes62
the number of players in S. A cooperative game with player set N is a function63
v : 2N → R assigning to each coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S) such that64
v(∅) = 0. The function v is called the characteristic function of the game and v(S)65
is the worth of the coalition S. This number is interpreted as what the coalition66
can obtain on its own. Let GN be the class of games with player set N . Given a67
nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , we denote by (S, vS) the subgame of (N, v) related to68
coalition S (i.e. vS (R) = v (R) for all R ⊆ S).69
A game v ∈ GN is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ), for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N . It is zero-70
monotonic if for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N we have v(S)+
∑
i∈T\S v({i}) ≤ v(T ) and it is grand71
coalition zero-monotonic if for all S ⊆ N we have v(S) +
∑
i∈N\S v({i}) ≤ v(N).72
A game v ∈ GN is superadditive if for all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅ it holds73
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ), and it is grand coalition superadditive if for all partition P74
of N , P = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}, it holds that
∑m
j=1 v(Sj) ≤ v(N).75
A game v ∈ GN is convex if, for all i ∈ N ,76
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ), (2)
for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i}. An equivalent definition of convexity states that, for all77
S,T ⊆ N ,78
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ). (3)
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 5
Finally, it is almost convex (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 1998) if for all S ⊆ N , S 6= N the79
corresponding subgame (S, vS) is convex.80
Let RN stand for the space of real-valued vectors x = (xi)i∈N where xi is81
interpreted as the payoff to player i ∈ N , xS is the restriction of x to the members82
of S ⊆ N and x(S) denotes
∑
i∈S xi, with the convention x(∅) = 0. Given x and y83
two vectors in RN , we write x ≥ y to mean that xi ≥ yi, for all i ∈ N .84
The set of preimputations of a game v ∈ GN is defined by I∗(N, v) = {x ∈85
RN |x(N) = v(N)}. Its set of imputations is defined by I(N, v) = {x ∈ RN |x(N) =86
v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ N} and its core is defined by C(N, v) = {x ∈87
RN |x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}. A game with a non-empty88
core is called a balanced game. Let BN ⊆ GN be the subclass of balanced games89
with player set N .90
Given a game v, a preimputation x ∈ I∗(N, v) and a pair of players i and j,
i 6= j, we define
s
v
ij(x) = max{v(S)− x(S) | S ⊆ N, i ∈ S but j 6∈ S}.
We say that player i outweigths player j at x if svij(x) > s
v
ji(x). The prekernel
of the game v, PK(N, v), is the subset of preimputations such that no player
outweights any other player at x. This is
PK(N, v) = {x ∈ I∗(N, v) | for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, svij(x) = s
v
ji(x)}.
For any game , the prekernel is always non-empty.91
The kernel was introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965). It is based on the idea92
of outweighting, but restricting the domain of feasible allocations to imputations.93
A more general concept was analyzed by Schmeidler (1969) allowing to consider94
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6 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
arbitrary payoff domains; in particular we are interested in those satisfying Y =95
Y (ℓ, u) = {x ∈ I∗(N, v) | ℓi ≤ xi ≤ ui, for all i ∈ N}, where ℓ = (ℓi)i∈N and96
u = (ui)i∈N , are the respective vectors of lower and upper bounds for the payoffs97
of players within Y with ℓ ≤ u. Notice that Y (ℓ, u) 6= ∅ when ℓ(N) ≤ v(N) ≤ u(N).98
Following Kikuta (1997), a payoff vector x belongs to the kernel of v relative to a99
nonempty box, K(N, v, Y (ℓ, u)), when for all pair of distinct players i and j it holds100
that: if svij(x) > s
v
ji(x), then either xi = ui or xj = ℓj . Being Y (ℓ, u) a non-empty101
set it follows that K(N, v, Y (ℓ, u)) 6= ∅ (see Schmeidler (1969)).102
Shimomura (1997) considers modifications of both the Mas-Colell bargaining103
set (Mas-Colell, 1989) and Zhou bargaining set (Zhou, 1994). As usual the bargain-104
ing set is defined by means of an interaction of objections and counterobjections.105
Let x ∈ RN . An objection to x is a pair (S, y), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and y ∈ RS with106
y(S) = v(S) such that yi > xi, for all i ∈ S. A counterobjection to (S, y) in the sense107
of Mas-Colell (a` la Shimomura) is a pair (T, z), z ∈ RT with z(T ) = v(T ) such that108
zi > yi, for all i ∈ T ∩S, and zi > xi for all i ∈ T \S. A counterobjection to (S, y) in109
the sense of Zhou (a` la Shimomura) is a pair (T, z), where T \ S 6= ∅, S \ T 6= ∅,110
T ∩ S 6= ∅, and z ∈ RT with z(T ) = v(T ) such that zi > yi, for all i ∈ T ∩ S, and111
zi > xi for all i ∈ T \ S. Notice the bargaining process represents strictly improve-112
ments (strictly higher payoffs) for all players involved in the objections and the113
counterobjections.114
Definition 1 The Mas-Colell bargaining set (a` la Shimomura) is defined as
MB∗(N, v) =


x ∈ I(N,v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
for each objection to x,
there is a Mas-Colell’s counterobjection


.
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 7
Definition 2 The Zhou bargaining set (a` la Shimomura) is defined as
Z∗(N, v) =


x ∈ I(N,v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
for each objection to x,
there is a Zhou’s counterobjection


.
If no confusion arises we will refer to them simply as the Mas-Colell bargaining set115
and the Zhou bargaining set. By definition, these sets only consist on imputations116
(individually rational payoff vectors) and always includes the core. Shimomura117
(1997) states that a sufficient condition that guarantees the Mas-Colell bargaining118
set to be nonempty is grand coalition zero-monotonicity, while it is grand coalition119
superadditivity that ensures the non-emptiness of the Zhou bargaining set.120
Shimomura also defines a subset of the Zhou bargaining set ( the steady bar-121
gaining set, SB(N, v)) by means of a dominant relationship between coalitions. He122
claims that the steady bargaining set can be rewritten as follows.123
Definition 3 Let v ∈ GN be a game. An imputation x ∈ I(N,v) is in the steady124
bargaining set SB(N, v) if for all coalition S ⊆ N with strictly positive excess125
v(S)− x(S) > 0, there exists M ⊆ N , such that S \M 6= ∅, M \S 6= ∅, S ∩M 6= ∅126
and v(M)− x(M) ≥ v(S)− x(S).127
For any game v, it can be easily proved the inclusions C(N, v) ⊆ SB(N, v) ⊆128
Z∗(N,v) ⊆MB∗(N, v); let us remark that these inclusions might be strict, even for129
superadditive games1. On the other hand, Izquierdo and Rafels (2012) show that130
1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of players and v(N) = 2, v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) =
v({1, 3, 4}) = v({2, 3, 4}) = 1, v({1, 3}) = v({1, 4}) = v({2, 3}) = 1 and v(S) = 0, other-
wise. Notice that the core of this game is non-emtpy. The payoff vector x = ( 1
2
, 1 1
2
, 0, 0) ∈
MB∗(N, v), but x 6∈ Z∗(N, v). Moreover, the payoff vector x′ = ( 1
2
, 1, 1
4
, 1
4
) ∈ Z∗(N, v), but
x′ 6∈ C(N, v). With respect to the steady bargaining set notice x′ = ( 1
2
, 1, 1
4
, 1
4
) ∈ SB(N, v),
but x′ 6∈ C(N, v). The Example 2 (with a = 1) in Shimomura (1997) provides an example of a
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8 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
the core of a convex game v and its Mas-Colell bargaining set (a` la Shimomura))131
do coincide, and thus, C(N, v) = SB(N, v) = Z∗(N, v) =MB∗(N, v).132
Let v ∈ BN be a balanced game and θ = (i1, i2, . . . , in) be an ordering of players
in N . We denote by ΘN the set of all orderings in N . A marginal worth vector of
the game v relative to θ, mθ(v), is defined as
mθi1(v) = v({i1}) and
mθik (v) = v({i1, . . . ik})− v({i1, . . . ik−1}), for all k = 2, . . . , n.
It is well-known (Shapley (1971), Ichiishi (1981)) that a game is convex if and only133
the marginal worth vectors of the game are all core elements.134
v is convex ⇔ mθ(v) ∈ C(N, v), for all θ ∈ ΘN . (4)
We say that vector x ∈ RN lexicographically precedes vector y ∈ RN with respect135
to θ = (i1, i2, . . . , in) ∈ ΘN , x ≺
θ
ℓ y, if there exists k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that136
xir = yir for all r = 1, . . . , k − 1 and xik < yik . The lexmin solution over the core137
of a balanced game v ∈ BN relative to θ ∈ ΘN is defined as the (unique) payoff138
vector ℓθ(v) ∈ C(N, v) that lexicographically precedes w.r.t. to θ any other vector139
in the core of the game v, i.e. ℓθ(v) ≺θℓ x for all x ∈ C(N, v). Let us remark that if140
a game v is convex then ℓθ(v) = mθ(v), for each ordering θ ∈ ΘN .141
3 Characterization results142
In this section we provide two new characterizations of the convexity of a game.143
The first one compares the steady bargaining set of the game with its core.144
To this aim, we first analyze the particular case of almost convex games (games145
superadditive game where the steady bargaining set is strictly included in the Zhou bargaining
set.
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 9
where all proper subgames are convex), since the argument used in the proof of146
the general case does not apply.147
The second characterization is a direct consequence of the first one, and focuses148
on the coincidence of the Zhou bargaining set with the core.149
Proposition 1 Let (N, v) be a grand coalition superadditive and almost convex game.150
Then, the following statements are equivalent:151
1. v is convex.152
2. SB(N, v) = C(N, v).153
Proof 1.→ 2.) From Izquierdo and Rafels (2012) it follows that, for any convex154
game v, C(N, v) = MB∗(N, v). Hence, since C(N, v) ⊆ SB(N, v) ⊆ MB∗(v), we155
conclude C(N, v) = SB(N, v).156
2.→ 1.) As the game v is grand coalition superadditive, the steady bargaining157
set is nonempty, i.e. SB(N, v) 6= ∅ (Shimomura, 1997), and thus (by hypothesis),158
SB(N,v) = C(N, v) 6= ∅. Therefore, the game is balanced. At this point, the proof159
is done for the two-person case, n = 2, since any two-person balanced game is160
convex. Hence, from now on let us assume n ≥ 3. Suppose to the contrary that the161
game is not convex. Since the game is almost convex but not convex, this means162
there exists a pair of players, say player 1 and player 2 such that163
v(N)− v(N \ {1}) < v(N \ {2})− v(N \ {1, 2}). (5)
From Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (1998) we know there is an extreme point x ∈ C(N, v) of164
the core of the game v such that2165
x1 = v(N)− v(N \ {1}) and x2 = v(N)− v(N \ {2}). (6)
2 These authors prove that particular payoff vectors constructed based upon orderings of
players θ = (i1, i2, . . . , in) (the reduced marginal worth vector rmθ(v)) are the extreme core
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10 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
By (5) and (6) it holds that
x1 = v(N)− v(N \ {1}) < v(N \ {2})− v(N \ {1, 2})
= v(N)− (v(N)− v(N \ {2}))− v(N \ {1, 2})
= v(N)− x2 − v(N \ {1, 2}) = x(N \ {2})− v(N \ {1, 2}).
We conclude, x(N \ {1, 2}) > v(N \ {1, 2}). Hence, let us remark now that the166
vector x restricted to N \ {1, 2}, xN\{1,2}, can be viewed as an aspiration of the167
subgame3 (N \{1, 2}, vN\{1,2}). Since this subgame is convex and any convex game168
has a large core4 (Sharkey 1982), there exists z ∈ C(N \ {1, 2}, vN\{1,2}) such that169
xN\{1,2} ≥ z. Moreover, since x(N \ {1, 2}) > v(N \ {1, 2}) = z(N \ {1, 2}) there170
exists a player in N \ {1, 2}, say player 3 such that x3 > z3. This implies that171
x(S) > z(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N \ {1, 2} and 3 ∈ S. (7)
Next define the vector x′ ∈ RN as follows:
x
′
1 = x1 +
ε
2
; x′2 = x2 +
ε
2
; x′3 = x3 − ε and x
′
k = xk for all k ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3},
where 0 < ε < min
3∈S⊆N\{1,2}
{x(S)− v(S)}.172
By the definition of ε the vector x′ is an imputation of the game v, but it is173
not a core element of (N, v) since x′1 > x1 = v(N)−v(N \{1}) and so x
′(N \{1}) <174
v(N \ {1}). However, for any coalition S ⊆ N such that v(S)− x′(S) > 0 it is easy175
to check that:176
elements of an almost convex balanced game. In particular, if θ = (1, 2, . . . , n), we have
rmθ1(v) = v(N)−v(N \{1}) and rm
θ
2(v) = min{v(N \{1})−v(N \{1, 2}), v(N)−v(N \{2})} =
v(N) − v(N \ {2}), where the last equality follows from (5).
3 An aspiration of a game (N, v) is a vector x′ ∈ RN satisfying all cores inequalities, i.e.
x′(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N .
4 A game has a large core if any aspiration x′ of the game can be represented by a core
allocation x, i.e. there exists x ∈ C(N, v) : xi ≤ x′i, for all i ∈ N .
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 11
(a) player 3 ∈ S;177
(b) either player 1 ∈ S or 2 ∈ S, but not both;178
(c) v(S)− x′(S) ≤ ε2 ; and179
(d) v(N \ {1})− x′(N \ {1}) = v(N \ {2})− x′(N \ {2}) = ε2 .180
Taking these remarks into account, let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary coalition with181
positive excess at x′, i.e. v(S)−x′(S) > 0. We next show that there exists a coalition182
M ⊆ N such thatM∩S 6= ∅, S\M 6= ∅,M\S 6= ∅ and v(M)−x′(M) ≥ v(S)−x′(S),183
and so that x′ is in the steady bargaining set of (N, v). We consider two cases:184
A: If player 1 ∈ S, take M = N \{1}. Notice that, by (c) and (d), v(M)−x′(M) =185
ε
2 ≥ v(S)− x
′(S). Moreover, by (a), player 3 ∈M ∩S, player 1 ∈ S \M and, by186
(b), player 2 ∈M \ S.187
B: If player 2 ∈ S, take M = N \ {2} and using an analogous reasoning we get188
that v(M)− x′(M) = ε2 ≥ v(S)− x
′(S) with player 3 ∈M ∩S, player 2 ∈ S \M189
and player 1 ∈M \ S.190
We conclude the allocation x′ is not a core element of the game v but belongs
to its steady bargaining set, i.e. x ∈ SB(N, v), which contradicts our hypothesis.
Hence, the game v must be convex. ⊓⊔
The above characterization result can be now extended to a larger class of191
cooperative games. The thread of the proof of this result relies on the fact that for192
a convex game all marginal worth vectors are core elements and coincide with the193
corresponding lexmin solution relative to the different orderings. As a consequence,194
if a game is not convex there is at least one marginal worth vector that differs from195
the corresponding lexmin solution; based upon this, we will construct a particular196
vector not in the core but in the steady bargaining set. That is, we shall prove that197
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
12 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
if a game is not convex the steady bargaining set of the game strictly includes its198
core. The proof of this result is constructive in the sense that, for any non-convex199
game satisfying conditions of Theorem 1, we built an allocation that turns out to200
be in the steady bargaining set of the game, but not in its core.201
Theorem 1 Let (N, v) be a zero-monotonic and grand coalition superadditive game.202
Then, the following statements are equivalent:203
1. v is convex.204
2. SB(N, v) = C(N, v).205
Proof 1.→ 2.) By convexity of the game v, it holds C(N, v) =MB∗(N,v) and thus,206
by (1), we conclude C(N, v) = SB(N, v).207
2.→ 1.) As the game v is grand coalition superadditive, the steady bargaining208
set is nonempty, i.e. SB(N, v) 6= ∅ (Shimomura, 1997), and thus (by hypothesis),209
SB(N,v) = C(N, v) 6= ∅. Therefore, the game is balanced and the lexmin solution210
ℓθ(v) is well-defined for all θ ∈ ΘN . Let us suppose now that the game is not convex.211
Then, by (4), there must exist at least one ordering θ = (i1, i2, . . . , in) ∈ ΘN such212
that ℓθ(v) 6= mθ(v). Now, if we pairwise compare the lexmin vector ℓθ(v) and the213
marginal worth vector mθ(v) corresponding to all orderings we can determine a214
unique index t∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfying that:215
(i) ℓθjk (v) = m
θ
jk
(v), for all θ = (j1, j2, . . . , jn) ∈ ΘN and k = 1, . . . , t
∗ − 1;
(ii) there exists θ∗ = (i1, i2, . . . , in) ∈ ΘN such that ℓ
θ∗
it∗
(v) 6= mθ
∗
it∗
(v).
(8)
Item (i) indicates that, for all ordering, the payoff of players occupying the first216
t∗− 1 positions coincide for both the lexmin vector and the marginal worth vector217
(notice that this condition does not impose any restriction when t∗ = 1); item218
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 13
(ii) states the existence of an ordering where the corresponding lexmin vector and219
marginal worth vector differ for the first time at position t∗.220
Notice that, by Proposition 1, we may assume that (N, v) is not an almost221
convex game and thus t∗ 6= n. Moreover, as ℓθ
∗
(v) is a core element, it can be222
checked in condition (ii) that223
ℓ
θ∗
it∗
(v) > mθ
∗
it∗
(v). (9)
To prove it, in other case and by (8), ℓθ
∗
it∗
(v) < mθ
∗
it∗
(v) = v({i1, . . . , it∗}) −224
v({i1, . . . , it∗−1}) = v({i1, . . . , it∗}) − m
θ∗(v)({i1, . . . , it∗−1}) = v({i1, . . . , it∗}) −225
ℓθ
∗
(v)({i1, . . . , it∗−1}), which involves a contradiction since ℓ
θ∗(v) ∈ C(N, v). Fi-226
nally, we can also deduce from the above condition (i) that,227
for all S ⊆ N with |S| < t∗, the subgame (S, vS) is convex. (10)
Now, define
Sθ
∗
(v) = {M ⊆ N |M 6= N, it∗ ∈M and ℓ
θ∗(v)(M) = v(M)},
where θ∗ = (i1, i2, . . . , in) is given in (ii) of (8).228
We claim Sθ
∗
(v) 6= ∅. Otherwise, ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) > v(M), for all M ⊆ N , M 6= N ,229
and it∗ ∈ M . Taking this into account we might define the allocation x ∈ R
N as230
xit∗ = ℓ
θ∗
it∗
(v) − ε1, xit∗+1 = ℓ
θ∗
it∗+1
(v) + ε1 and xik = ℓ
θ∗
ik
(v), else, where 0 < ε1 <231
min
M N,it∗∈M
{ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)− v(M)}, and prove that x ∈ C(N, v). However, this would232
contradict ℓθ
∗
(v) to be the lexmin solution relative to θ∗ over the core of the game233
v.234
Let us denote by Sθ
∗
min(v) the set of minimal coalitions with respect to the235
inclusion in the ordered set (Sθ
∗
(v),⊆) and by T ∗ the first t∗ agents of the ordering236
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14 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
θ∗ = (i1, . . . , in) given in (8) , i.e. T
∗ = {i1, . . . , it∗}. Notice that237
ℓ
θ∗(v)(T ∗) > v(T ∗), (11)
where the strict inequality follows from (8) and (9), since ℓθ
∗
(v)(T ∗) = ℓθ
∗
(v)(T ∗ \238
{it∗}) + ℓ
θ∗
it∗
(v) = mθ
∗
(v)(T ∗ \ {it∗}) + ℓ
θ∗
it∗
(v) > mθ
∗
(v)(T ∗) = v(T ∗).239
Next, it can be shown that the set Sθ
∗
min(v) contains at least two coalitions.240
This result is stated in Claim 1 but the rather technical proof is consigned into241
the Appendix.242
Claim 1 |Sθ
∗
min(v)| ≥ 2.243
Taking into account this claim, define α ∈ RN as244
αi =


ℓθ
∗
i (v)− ε if i = it∗
ℓθ
∗
i (v) if i ∈ N, i 6= it∗
where
0 < ε < min
M⊆N
ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)>v(M)
{ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)− v(M)}.
Notice that the parameter ε is well defined since (11) holds. Moreover, we have245
that α(N) < v(N).246
Take Iθ
∗
=
⋂
M∈Sθ
∗
min(v)
M and notice that, by definition, it∗ ∈ I
θ∗ (and thus247
Iθ
∗
6= ∅), M \ Iθ
∗
6= ∅ for all M ∈ Sθ
∗
min(v), and N \ I
θ∗ 6= ∅ where the last two248
assertions follow from Claim 1.249
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 15
Then define the game (N \ Iθ
∗
, ω) as follows:
ω(∅) = 0,
ω(R) = max
R′⊆R
Q⊆Iθ
∗
{v(R′ ∪Q)− α(R′ ∪Q)} for all ∅ 6= R ⊆ N \ Iθ
∗
.
Let us remark that ω(R) ∈ {0, ε}, for all R ⊆ N \ Iθ
∗
, and ω(N \ Iθ
∗
) = ε. To check250
this we first claim that, given M ⊆ N , we have251
v(M)− α(M) =


0 if M = ∅
ε if M ∈ Sθ
∗
(v) or M = N
≤ 0 otherwise.
(12)
Indeed, if M = ∅, v(∅) − α(∅) = 0; if M ∈ Sθ
∗
(v) or M = N then v(M) =252
ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) and v(M) − α(M) = v(M) − ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) + ε = ε; finally, if M 6∈ Sθ
∗
(v)253
and M 6= N,∅ then either it∗ 6∈M or v(M) < ℓ
θ∗(v)(M): if it∗ 6∈ M , then v(M)−254
α(M) = v(M) − ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) ≤ 0, and if it∗ ∈ M but v(M) < ℓ
θ∗(v)(M), then255
v(M)− α(M) = v(M)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) + ε < 0, where the last strict inequality follows256
from the definition of ε.257
Taking (12) into account, and since for all R ⊆ N \ Iθ
∗
, ω(R) is the maximum258
of differences v(M) − α(M), where M ⊆ R ∪ Iθ
∗
, it follows that ω(R) ∈ {0, ε}. To259
see ω(N \ Iθ
∗
) = ε just take R′ = N \ Iθ
∗
and Q = Iθ
∗
in its definition.260
Now take an element δ ∈ RN\I
θ∗
in the prekernel of the game (N \Iθ
∗
, ω), that
is δ ∈ PK(N \ Iθ
∗
, ω). By the monotonicity of the game (N \ Iθ
∗
, ω) and Theorem
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16 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
5.6.1 in Peleg and Su¨dholter (2007) it follows5 that
(a) δi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N \ I
θ∗
. (13)
(b) δi = 0, for all i ∈ N \
⋃
M∈Sθ
∗
min(v)
M. (14)
To see (b), let i ∈ N \
⋃
M∈Sθ
∗
min(v)
M and let R ⊆ N \ Iθ
∗
with i ∈ R. Let us check
that ω(R) − ω(R \ {i}) = 0. If ω(R) = 0, by the monotonicity of the game ω,
we are done. If ω(R) = ε, we know by (12) that ω(R) = v(M) − α(M), for some
coalitionM ∈ Sθ
∗
(v) or ω(R) = v(N)−α(N). In case ω(R) = v(M)−α(M) for some
M ∈ Sθ
∗
(v), we can take, in fact, M ∈ Sθ
∗
min(v); in case ω(R) = v(N)−α(N), then
R = N \ Iθ
∗
and for any M ∈ Sθ
∗
min(v) we have that ε = w(N \ I
θ∗) ≥ w(M \ Iθ
∗
) ≥
v(M)− α(M) = ε, where the first inequality follows from the monotonicity of the
game and the last equality by (12). Thus we conclude that, in any of both cases,
ω(R) = v(M)−α(M) withM ∈ Sθ
∗
min(v). Now, since by hypothesis of case (b) player
i does not belong to any minimal coalition in Sθ
∗
min(v), it followsM ⊆ (R\{i})∪I
θ∗
and then we conclude that
ε ≥ ω(R \ {i}) = max
R′⊆R\{i}
Q⊆Iθ
∗
{v(R′ ∪Q)− α(R′ ∪Q)} ≥ v(M)− α(M) = ε,
and we are done.261
Next define the vector x ∈ RN as follows:
xi =


αi + δi if i ∈ N \ I
θ∗
αi if i ∈ I
θ∗ .
5 We are using the fact that for any δ ∈ PK(N \ Iθ
∗
, ω) and for any i ∈ N \ Iθ
∗
,
min
R⊆N\Iθ
∗
:i∈R
{ω(R) − ω(R \ {i})} ≤ δi ≤ max
R⊆N\Iθ
∗
:i∈R
{ω(R) − ω(R \ {i})}.
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 17
The vector x is efficient, x(N) = v(N), and individually rational in the original262
game (N, v), i.e. xi ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ N . Only the case i = it∗ deserves some263
attention. Indeed, by (9), we have ℓθ
∗
it∗
(v) > mθ
∗
it∗
(v) ≥ v({it∗}), where the last264
inequality comes by zero-monotonicity of the game (N, v). Therefore, xit∗ = αit∗ =265
ℓθ
∗
it∗
− ε ≥ v({it∗}). Thus, x is an imputation of the game (N, v).266
However, let us argue that x 6∈ C(N, v). As δ(N \ Iθ
∗
) = ε > 0, there must exist267
i ∈ N \ Iθ
∗
such that δi > 0. Moreover, there also must exist M ∈ S
θ∗
min(v) such268
that i 6∈ M (otherwise i ∈ Iθ
∗
). Hence, δ(M \ Iθ
∗
) < ε and thus v(M) − x(M) =269
v(M)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)+ε− δ(M \Iθ
∗
) > v(M)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) = 0, where the last equality270
comes fromM ∈ Sθ
∗
min(v). Hence, we obtain that v(M)−x(M) > 0 and we conclude271
x 6∈ C(N, v).272
At this point, it is also important to notice that273
for any M ⊆ N with v(M)− x(M) > 0, we have M ∈ Sθ
∗
(v). (15)
To see this, if M 6∈ Sθ
∗
(v) then, by (12), v(M)−α(M) ≤ 0. Hence, v(M)−x(M) =274
v(M)− α(M)− δ(M \ Iθ
∗
) ≤ 0, which involves a contradiction.275
We finally check that x is in the steady bargaining set of the game v. To this276
aim take S ⊆ N such that v(S) − x(S) > 0. We shall prove there exists M ⊆ N277
such that M \ S 6= ∅, S \M 6= ∅, S ∩M 6= ∅ and v(M)− x(M) ≥ v(S)− x(S).278
First, recall that S ∈ Sθ
∗
(v) (see (15)). Now, let S′ ∈ Sθ
∗
min(v) with S
′ ⊆ S such279
that280
v(S′)− x(S′) ≥ v(P )− x(P ), for all P ∈ Sθ
∗
min(v) with P ⊆ S. (16)
Since v(S)− x(S) = v(S)− α(S)− δ(S \ Iθ
∗
) = v(S)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) + ε− δ(S \ Iθ
∗
) =281
ε− δ(S \ Iθ
∗
) > 0, we have δ(S \ Iθ
∗
) < ε. Therefore, there must exist j ∈ N \ Iθ
∗
,282
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18 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
j 6∈ S with δj > 0. On the other hand, by Claim 1, let us select an arbitrary player283
i ∈ S′ \ Iθ
∗
; notice that i 6= j since j 6∈ S′ because S′ ⊆ S.284
Then, from (12) it follows that285
0 < v(S)− x(S) = v(S)− α(S)− δ(S \ Iθ
∗
) = ε− δ(S \ Iθ
∗
)
= v(S′)− α(S′)− δ(S \ Iθ
∗
)
≤ v(S′)− α(S′)− δ(S′ \ Iθ
∗
) = v(S′)− x(S′).
(17)
That is, the excess of coalition S ⊆ N at x is smaller than the excess of coalition286
S′ ⊆ S at x. Taking this fact into account we also have287
0 < v(S)− x(S) ≤ v(S′)− x(S′) = v(S′)− α(S′)− δ(S′ \ Iθ
∗
)
≤ ω(S′ \ Iθ
∗
)− δ(S′ \ Iθ
∗
)
≤ sωij(δ) = s
ω
ji(δ) = ω(R)− δ(R),
(18)
for some R ⊆ N \ Iθ
∗
such that j ∈ R but i 6∈ R. Finally,288
ω(R)− δ(R) = v(R′ ∪Q)− α(R′ ∪Q)− δ(R)
≤ v(R′ ∪Q)− α(R′ ∪Q)− δ(R′) = v(R′ ∪Q)− x(R′ ∪Q),
(19)
for some R′ ⊆ R and Q ⊆ Iθ
∗
. The coalition M = R′ ∪ Q is precisely the one we289
next use to prove that x is in the steady bargaining set of v. Notice that i 6∈ M290
since i 6∈ R ∪ Iθ
∗
.291
First, from (18) and (19), we can deduce that v(S) − x(S) ≤ v(M) − x(M).292
Furthermore, since v(M)− x(M) > 0 and v(S)− x(S) > 0, by (15), it follows that293
Iθ
∗
⊆ M ∩ S which implies M ∩ S 6= ∅. Moreover, i ∈ S \M since i ∈ S′ ⊆ S and294
i 6∈ R′ (since i 6∈ R) and i 6∈ Q ( since i 6∈ Iθ
∗
) .295
Finally, if j ∈ M then j ∈ M \ S and thus M \ S 6= ∅. If j 6∈ M , we still claim296
thatM \S 6= ∅. To check it, let us suppose on the contrary thatM ⊆ S and j 6∈M .297
Taking into account that δj > 0, j ∈ R and j 6∈M the non-strict inequality in (19)298
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 19
becomes strict; that is ω(R)− δ(R) < v(M)−x(M) and thus, by (18) and (19), we299
obtain300
0 < v(S′)− x(S′) < v(M)− x(M). (20)
By (15), there exists M ′ ⊆M where M ′ ∈ Sθ
∗
min(v). Therefore,301
v(M)−x(M) = ε−δ(M \Iθ
∗
) ≤ v(M ′)−α(M ′)−δ(M ′\Iθ
∗
) = v(M ′)−x(M ′). (21)
By (20) and (21) we conclude that v(S′) − x(S′) < v(M ′) − x(M ′) being M ′ ∈
Sθ
∗
min(v) and M
′ ⊆ M ⊆ S. However, this contradicts (16) and we conclude that
M \ S 6= ∅. This last result proves that x is not in the core of v but in its steady
bargaining set, and the proof of this implication ends. ⊓⊔
As far as we know the conditions of zero-monotonicity and gran coalition su-302
peradditivity cannot be dropped from Theorem 1 out.303
Concerning the zero-monotonicity condition, next example proves its necessity.304
Let (N, v) be a four-player game where N = {1, 2,3, 4} and v(S) = 1, if |S| = 1,305
v(S) = 2, if |S| = 2 or |S| = 3 and v(N) = 4. It is easy to see that (N, v) is neither306
convex nor zero-monotonic, but C(N, v) = SB(N,v) = {(1,1, 1, 1)}.307
Grand coalition superadditivity is needed to guarantee that the steady bar-308
gaining set is nonempty. It remains an open question whether zero-monotonicity309
implies the nonemptiness of the steady bargaining set.310
As a consequence of Theorem 1 and the characterization result of Izquierdo311
and Rafels (2012) we get the following corollary.312
Corollary 1 Let v ∈ GN be a zero-monotonic and grand coalitional superadditive313
game. Then, the following statements are equivalent:314
1. Z∗(N, v) = C(N, v).315
2. v is a convex game.316
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20 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
4 Conclusions317
Bargaining sets face the problem of distributing profits focusing on the negotiation318
(objections and counterobjections) between agents. Besides this, there are concepts319
of bargaining sets (e.g. Davis and Maschler (1963, 1967) or Shubik (1984)) that put320
the stress on the player who leads the objection. For these bargaining sets, there are321
examples of non-convex cooperative games for whom the core and the bargaining322
set do coincide (for instance, this is the case of average monotonic cooperative games323
(Izquierdo and Rafels, 2001), or assignment games (for the proof of this coincidence324
see Solymosi(2008)).325
In Izquierdo and Rafels (2012), it has been already shown that a modification326
of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Shimomura 1997) has been useful to character-327
ize the convexitiy of a game This notion of bargaining set considers objections328
and counterobjections as proposals made by a group rather than an action led329
by an specific player. It is also important to remark that agents receive strictly330
better rewards in objections and counterobjections. Following this idea of group331
proposals and strictly positive incentives, we have proved in this paper that the332
modified Zhou bargaining set also characterizes convex games within the class of333
zero-monotonic and grand coalition superadditive games. The difference between334
both bargaining sets relies on the qualification of coalitions than might counter-335
object: while in the Mas-Colell version there are no restrictions on which are the336
coalitions T that are allowed to react to an objection made by a coalition S, the337
Zhou’s framework requires some conditions. First, there must be at least one player338
belonging to both coalitions; if not, S ∩ T = ∅, and the counterobjection might339
be interpreted as a different objection rather than a proper counter-objection.340
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 21
Second, at least one player involved in the objection must not be involved in the341
counterobjection; if not, S ⊆ T , and the counterobjection might be interpreted342
as a reinforcement to the objection. Finally, the counterobjecting coalition must343
involved at least an agent not taking part in the objection; if not, T ⊆ S, but this344
fact might suggest that the original objection should be revised but not rejected.345
From the point of view of characterizing convex games, our result reveals that it346
is not so important if we just consider one, two, three or none of the above re-347
quirements for the counterobjecting coalitions. Objections and counter-objections348
made as a group and strictly positive incentives are the important keys to reach349
these results.350
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Proof of Claim 1.392
Let us recall that the claim is under the hypothesis C(N, v) = SB(N, v). Next,393
assume |Sθ
∗
min(v)| = 1, say S
θ∗
min(v) = {S
∗}, where θ∗ = (i1, i2, . . . , in). Then, we394
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 23
shall prove that there exists x ∈ SB(N, v) but x 6∈ C(N, v), which contradicts the395
hypothesis of the coincidence of the core and the steady bargaining set. Along the396
proof of this claim we will analyze and prove several subclaims.397
Subclaim 1.1 The coalition S∗ is included in T ∗ = {i1, . . . , it∗}.398
Proof Let us suppose that there exists it′ ∈ S
∗ with t′ ∈ {t∗+1, t∗+2, . . . , n}. Then,
define the vector x ∈ RN as xit∗ = ℓ
θ∗
it∗
(v)− ε2, xit′ = ℓ
θ∗
it′
(v)+ ε2 and xik = ℓ
θ∗
ik
(v),
else, where
0 < ε2 < min
it∗∈M⊆N
ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)>v(M)
{ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)− v(M)}.
By (11), the parameter ε2 is well-defined. To end the proof, we show that x ∈
C(N, v) contradicting ℓθ
∗
(v) to be the lexmin core vector of v relative to θ∗. To see
this point, it is straightforward that x(N) = v(N). Moreover, if M ⊆ N , M 6= N ,
and it∗ 6∈ M then x(M) ≥ ℓ
θ∗(v)(M) ≥ v(M). If it∗ ∈ M and ℓ
θ∗(v)(M) > v(M),
then x(M) ≥ ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)− ε2 > ℓ
θ∗(v)(M)− (ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)− v(M)) = v(M). Finally, if
it∗ ∈M and ℓ
θ∗(v)(M) = v(M) thenM ∈ Sθ(v), and S∗ ⊆M since there is a unique
minimal coalition in Sθ
∗
(v). Thus it′ ∈M . Hence, x(M) = ℓ
θ∗(v)(M) ≥ v(M) and
x ∈ C(N, v), ending the proof of this subclaim. ⊓⊔
Subclaim 1.2 The number of players in T ∗ = {i1, . . . , it∗} is at least three, i.e. t
∗ ≥399
3.400
Proof It is clear that if t∗ = 1 then T ∗ = {i1} and the unique minimal coalition
in Sθ
∗
(v) must be S∗ = {i1}. Then, by (9), ℓ
θ∗
i1
(v) > mθ
∗
i1
(v) = v({i1}) which
contradicts S∗ ∈ Sθ
∗
(v). Moreover if t∗ = 2 then T ∗ = {i1, i2}, ℓ
θ∗
i1
(v) = mθ
∗
i1
(v) =
v({i1}) by (8), and ℓ
θ∗
i2
(v) > mθ
∗
i2
(v) = v({i1, i2})−v({i1}) ≥ v({i2}), where the last
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inequality comes from zero-monotonicity. From this we deduce ℓθ
∗
i1
(v) + ℓθ
∗
i2
(v) >
v({i1, i2}), which contradicts the fact that the unique minimal coalition in S
θ∗(v)
must be a subset of T ∗ (see Subclaim 1.1.). ⊓⊔
Let us recall (see (10)) that any subgame (R, vR), with R ⊆ T
∗, R 6= T ∗, is a
convex game. Therefore, the maximal marginal contribution of player it∗ ∈ N to
any subcoalition6 Q  T ∗ \{it∗} is attained at a coalition containing t
∗−2 players;
that is, without loss of generality
max
Q T∗\{it∗}
{v(Q ∪ {it∗})− v(Q)} = v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2, it∗})− v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2}).
Subclaim 1.3 ℓθ
∗
it∗
(v) = v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2, it∗})− v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2}).401
Proof First, by (8), if ℓθ
∗
it∗
(v) < v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2, it∗}) − v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2}) =
v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2, it∗})− ℓ
θ∗(v)({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2}), then
ℓ
θ∗(v)({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2, it∗}) < v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2, it∗}),
which contradicts ℓθ
∗
(v) ∈ C(N, v).402
On the other hand, if ℓθ
∗
it∗
(v) > v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2, it∗}) − v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2}),
then, since ℓθ
∗
(v) ∈ C(N, v),
ℓθ
∗
it∗
(v) > v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2, it∗})− v({i1, i2, . . . , it∗−2})
= max
Q T∗\{it∗}
{v(Q ∪ {it∗})− v(Q)} ≥ max
Q T∗\{it∗}
{v(Q ∪ {it∗})− ℓ
θ∗(v)(Q)}.
Thus, ℓθ
∗
(v)(Q ∪ {it∗}) > v(Q ∪ {it∗}), for all Q  {i1, i2, . . . , it∗−1}. However
adding this result to ( 11) we reach a contradiction with Subclaim 1.1. ⊓⊔
Next, let us define
J
θ∗ = {i ∈ T ∗ = {i1, i2, . . . , it∗} | ℓ
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ {i}) = v(T ∗ \ {i})}.
6 The symbol  between two coalitions S  T means S ⊆ T and S 6= T .
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Notice that, by (8) (i), ℓθ
∗
(v)(T ∗ \ {it∗}) = m
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ {it∗}) = v(T
∗ \ {it∗}) and403
so it∗ ∈ J
θ∗ . Furthermore, by Subclaim 1.3 it follows that it∗−1 ∈ J
θ∗ and thus404
{it∗−1, it∗} ⊆ J
θ∗ . Therefore,405
|Jθ
∗
| ≥ 2. (22)
Finally, by zero-monotonicity of the game v, it holds406
ℓ
θ∗
i (v) > v({i}), for all i ∈ J
θ∗
. (23)
To check this last point, notice that, by zero-monotonicity of v, if ℓθ
∗
i (v) = v({i})407
then ℓθ
∗
(v)(T ∗) = ℓθ
∗
i (v) + ℓ
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ {i}) = v({i}) + v(T ∗ \ {i}) ≤ v(T ∗) which408
contradicts (11). Next, let us prove the following subclaim.409
Subclaim 1.4 For all S ⊆ T ∗ such that ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) = v(S), then Jθ
∗
\ S 6= ∅.410
Proof Since it∗ ∈ J
θ∗ , the result is trivial if it∗ 6∈ S. If it∗ ∈ S, let κ ∈ {1, . . . , t
∗−1}411
such that iκ 6∈ S and iκ+1, iκ+2, . . . , it∗ ∈ S. Notice that the index κ is well-defined412
since, by (11), we have S 6= T ∗. We next prove that iκ ∈ Jθ
∗
\ S. To see this, first413
notice that414
v(T ∗ \ {iκ}) ≤ ℓ
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ {iκ}) = ℓ
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ (S ∪ {iκ})) + ℓ
θ∗(v)(S)
= mθ
∗
(v)(T ∗ \ (S ∪ {iκ})) + ℓ
θ∗(v)(S).
(24)
Notice that T ∗ \ (S ∪ {iκ}) ⊆ {i1, i2, . . . , i κ−1} and thus we describe T
∗ \ (S ∪
{iκ}) = {ir1 , ir2 , . . . , irm}, where r1 < r2 < · · · < rm < κ. Moreover, and for all
irj ∈ T
∗ \ (S ∪ {iκ}), let us denote by P
θ∗
irj
= {i1, i2 , . . . , i(rj)−1} ⊆ N the set of
predecessors of player irj relative to the ordering
θ
∗ = (i1, i2, . . . , ir1 , . . . , ir2 , . . . , irj , . . . , iκ, iκ+1, . . . , in).
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Then, we have
mθ
∗
(v)(T ∗ \ (S ∪ {iκ})) =
m∑
j=1
m
θ∗
rj (v) =
m∑
j=1
[v(P θ
∗
irj
∪ {irj})− v(P
θ∗
irj
)]
≤
m−1∑
j=1
[v((P θ
∗
irm
\ {irj , irj+1 , . . . , irm−1}) ∪ {irj })− v(P
θ∗
irm
\ {irj , irj+1 , . . . , irm−1})]
+v(P θ
∗
irm
∪ {irm})− v(P
θ∗
irm
)
= v(P θ
∗
irm
∪ {irm})− v(P
θ∗
irm
\ {ir1 , ir2 , . . . , irm−1})
≤ v(P θ
∗
irm
∪ {it∗} ∪ {irm})− v((P
θ∗
irm
∪ {it∗}) \ {ir1 , ir2 , . . . , irm−1})
≤ v(T ∗ \ {iκ})− v(T
∗ \ {ir1 , ir2 , . . . , irm , iκ})
= v(T ∗ \ {iκ})− v(S),
where the first inequality follows from (2), the convexity of the subgame
(T ∗ \ {iκ}, vT∗\{iκ}) and the fact that, for all j = 1, . . . , m− 1, we have
P
θ∗
irj
⊆ P θ
∗
irm
\ {irj , irj+1 , . . . , irm−1},
the second inequality follows from the convexity of the subgame (T ∗\{iκ}, vT∗\{iκ}),415
and the third one by taking in (3) M = P θ
∗
irm
∪ {it∗} ∪ {irm} and M
′ = T ∗ \416
{ir1 , ir2 , . . . , irm , iκ}. Therefore, we obtain that m
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ (S ∪ {iκ})) ≤ v(T
∗ \417
{iκ})− v(S). Using this inequality in (24) we obtain418
v(T ∗ \ {iκ}) ≤ ℓ
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ {iκ}) ≤ m
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ (S ∪ {iκ})) + ℓ
θ∗(v)(S)
≤ v(T ∗ \ {iκ})− v(S) + ℓ
θ∗(v)(S) = v(T ∗ \ {iκ}).
Therefore, we conclude that v(T ∗ \ {iκ}) = ℓ
θ∗(v)(T ∗ \ {iκ}) which implies
iκ ∈ J
θ∗ \ S, as we want to prove. ⊓⊔
Once we have proved the above subclaims, let us define the vector β ∈ RN as419
βi =


ℓθ
∗
i (v)− ε3 if i ∈ J
θ∗
ℓθ
∗
i (v) if i ∈ N \ J
θ∗ ,
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 27
where
0 < n · ε3 < min
M ⊆ N
ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) > v(M)
{ℓθ
∗
(v)(M)− v(M)}.
By (23),420
βi ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ J
θ∗
. (25)
Hence, define the game (N \ T ∗, ω) as follows:421
ω(∅) = 0
ω(R) = max
Q⊆T∗
{v(R ∪Q)− β(R ∪Q)}, for all ∅ 6= R ⊆ N \ T ∗.
Let us remark that ω(R) ≤ |Jθ
∗
| · ε3, for any ∅ 6= R ⊆ N \ T
∗. To check it,422
simply notice that ω(R) = v(R ∪ Q∗) − β(R ∪ Q∗) for some Q∗ ⊆ T ∗, and thus423
ω(R) = v(R ∪Q∗)− β(R ∪Q∗) = v(R ∪Q∗)− ℓθ
∗
(R ∪Q∗) + |Q∗ ∩ Jθ
∗
| · ε3 ≤ |Q
∗ ∩424
Jθ
∗
|·ε3 ≤ |J
θ∗ |·ε3. Moreover, for the case R = N \T
∗ we have ω(N \T ∗) = |Jθ
∗
|·ε3,425
just by taking Q = T ∗ in its definition.426
Next, define the subset Y of vectors in RN\T
∗
as follows:
Y = {α ∈ RN\T
∗
| αi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N \T
∗ and α(N \T ∗) = ω(N\T ∗) = |Jθ
∗
|·ε3}.
Notice that Y is a non-empty and compact subset of the preimputation set I∗(N \427
T ∗, ω), and thus, by Schmeidler (1969), the kernel7 of the game (N \T ∗, ω) relative428
to Y is non-empty, i.e. K(N \ T ∗, ω, Y ) 6= ∅.429
7 Notice that the set Y is a non-empty box since it can be rewritten as
Y = {α ∈ RN\T
∗
| 0 ≤ αi ≤ |J
θ
∗
| · ε3, for all i ∈ N \ T
∗, and α(N \ T ∗) = |Jθ
∗
| · ε3}.
.
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
28 Josep Maria Izquierdo, Carles Rafels
Hence, select an element δ in the kernel of the game (N \ T ∗, ω) relative to Y ,430
i.e. δ ∈ K(N \ T ∗, ω, Y ), and define the vector x ∈ RN as follows:431
xi =


βi + δi = ℓ
θ∗
i (v) + δi if i ∈ N \ T
∗
βi = ℓ
θ∗
i (v) if i ∈ T
∗ \ Jθ
∗
βi = ℓ
θ∗
i (v)− ε3 if i ∈ J
θ∗ .
The vector x is an imputation of the game (N,v): clearly, x is efficient, x(N) =432
v(N); moreover, by definition of ε3 and (23), we have xi = ℓ
θ∗
i (v) − ε3 ≥ v({i}),433
for all i ∈ Jθ
∗
, xi = ℓ
θ∗
i (v) ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ T
∗ \ Jθ
∗
and, since δi ≥ 0,434
xi = βi + δi = ℓ
θ∗
i (v) + δi ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ N \ T
∗.435
However, it is not in the core of the game (N,v) since x(T ∗\{it∗}) = ℓ
θ∗(v)(T ∗\436
{it∗})− (|J
θ∗ | − 1)ε3 = v(T
∗ \ {it∗})− (|J
θ∗ | − 1)ε3 < v(T
∗ \ {it∗}).437
We finally check that x is in the steady bargaining set of the game (N, v). To438
this aim take S ⊆ N such that v(S)−x(S) > 0. Notice that, since x ∈ I(N,v), then439
|S| ≥ 2. Furthermore, it holds that440
S ∩ Jθ
∗
6= ∅, (26)
since otherwise S ∩ Jθ
∗
= ∅ and we would have
v(S)− x(S) = v(S)− β(S)− δ(S ∩ (N \ T ∗)) ≤ v(S)− β(S)
= v(S)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) ≤ 0,
reaching a contradiction with v(S) − x(S) > 0. Next, we shall prove there exists441
M ⊆ N such thatM \S 6= ∅, S\M 6= ∅, S∩M 6= ∅ and v(M)−x(M) ≥ v(S)−x(S).442
We distinguish two cases.443
A: S ⊆ T ∗ = {i1, . . . , it∗}. By the way we have defined ε3, and being S ⊆ T
∗, let us
first see that ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) = v(S). To check it, let us suppose that ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) > v(S),
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 29
then v(S)−x(S) = v(S)−ℓθ
∗
(v)(S)+ |S∩Jθ
∗
| ·ε3 ≤ v(S)−ℓ
θ∗(v)(S)+n ·ε3 < 0,
which contradicts the hypothesis v(S)−x(S) > 0. Moreover, by (26), S∩Jθ
∗
6=
∅, and, by Subclaim 1.4, Jθ
∗
\S 6= ∅. Let j ∈ Jθ
∗
\ S and i ∈ Jθ
∗
∩S and take
M = T ∗ \ {i}. Notice that j ∈M \ S, i ∈ S \M and, since |S| ≥ 2, M ∩ S 6= ∅.
Furthermore, since i ∈ Jθ
∗
we have ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) = v(M), and thus
v(M)− x(M) = v(M)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(M) + (|Jθ
∗
| − 1) · ε3
= v(S)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) + (|Jθ
∗
| − 1) · ε3 ≥ v(S)− x(S),
where the inequality follows since j ∈ Jθ
∗
\ S.444
B: S∩(N \T ∗) 6= ∅. First let us remark that S∩(N \T ∗) 6= N \T ∗, or equivalently445
N \ (T ∗ ∪ S) 6= ∅; this holds since, otherwise, S ∩ (N \ T ∗) = N \ T ∗ and446
v(S)− x(S) = v(S)− β(S)− δ(N \ T ∗) = v(S)− β(S)− ω(N \ T ∗)
= v(S)− β(S)− |Jθ
∗
| · ε3
= v(S)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) + |S ∩ Jθ
∗
| · ε3 − |J
θ∗ | · ε3 ≤ 0,
(27)
reaching a contradiction.447
Hence, let i ∈ S ∩ (N \ T ∗) and select j ∈ (N \ T ∗) \ S = N \ (T ∗ ∪ S) such that448
s
ω
ji(δ) ≥ s
ω
ij(δ). (28)
Let us prove that such a player j exists. To check it, suppose that, given an
arbitrary k ∈ (N \ T ∗) \ S, we would have sωki(δ) < s
ω
ik(δ). Since δ ∈ K(N \
T ∗, ω, Y ) then we would have that either δk = 0 or δi = |J
θ∗ | ·ε3. However, δi =
|Jθ
∗
| · ε3 is not possible since, by a similar reasoning as in (27), we would reach
a contradiction with v(S)− x(S) > 0. Therefore, we obtain that δk = 0. Since
k was chosen arbitrarily, we would conclude that δk = 0 for all k ∈ (N \ T
∗) \S
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and thus
|Jθ
∗
| · ε3 = ω(N \ T
∗) = δ(N \ T ∗) = δ((N \ T ∗) ∩ S).
But then,
v(S)− x(S) = v(S)− β(S)− δ(S ∩ (N \ T ∗))
= v(S)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) + |S ∩ Jθ
∗
| · ε3 − |J
θ∗ | · ε3 ≤ v(S)− ℓ
θ∗(v)(S) ≤ 0,
getting a contradiction with v(S)− x(S) > 0.449
Now, by definition and taking agents i and j as in (28), we have
s
ω
ji(δ) = ω(R
∗)−δ(R∗) = v(R∗∪Q∗)−β(R∗∪Q∗)−δ(R∗) = v(R∗∪Q∗)−x(R∗∪Q∗),
for some R∗ ⊆ N \ T ∗, with j ∈ R∗ but i 6∈ R∗, and some Q∗ ⊆ T ∗. Hence, by450
(28), it follows that451
v(R∗ ∪Q∗)− x(R∗ ∪Q∗) = sωji(δ) ≥ s
ω
ij(δ)
≥ ω(S ∩ (N \ T ∗))− δ(S ∩ (N \ T ∗))
≥ v(S)− x(S) > 0.
(29)
Notice that i ∈ S\(R∗∪Q∗) and j ∈ (R∗∪Q∗)\S. Furthermore, if S∩(R∗∪Q∗) 6=452
∅, then takeM = R∗∪Q∗ and we are done. Otherwise, in case S∩(R∗∪Q∗) = ∅453
we have, by (26), (R∗ ∪Q∗) ∩ Jθ
∗
6= ∅.454
Hence, since we are supposing S ∩ (R∗ ∪ Q∗) = ∅, (R∗ ∪ Q∗) ∩ Jθ
∗
6= ∅ and455
S ∩ Jθ
∗
6= ∅ (see (26)), we conclude that456
S ∩ Jθ
∗
 Jθ
∗
. (30)
Therefore,
v(S)− x(S) = v(S)− β(S)− δ(S ∩ (N \ T ∗))
= v(S)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) + |S ∩ Jθ
∗
| · ε3 − δ(S ∩ (N \ T
∗))
≤ v(S)− ℓθ
∗
(v)(S) + |S ∩ Jθ
∗
| · ε3
≤ (|Jθ
∗
| − 1) · ε3.
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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games 31
Hence, it easily follows that457
v(S)− x(S) ≤ (|Jθ
∗
| − 1) · ε3 = v(T
∗ \ {k})− x(T ∗ \ {k}) (31)
for all k ∈ Jθ
∗
. Finally, by (26) and the fact that Jθ
∗
⊆ T ∗, we have S∩T ∗ 6= ∅.458
At this point we distinguish two cases:459
– B.1 If |S ∩ T ∗| = 1, i.e. S ∩ T ∗ = {i′}, then take M = T ∗ \ {k} where460
k ∈ Jθ
∗
\ S (such a player exists since |Jθ
∗
| ≥ 2, see (22)). In this subcase,461
i′ ∈ M ∩ S, M \ S 6= ∅, since by Subclaim 1.2, t∗ ≥ 3, and S \M 6= ∅, by462
the hypothesis of case B.463
– B.2 If |S∩T ∗| ≥ 2, then takeM = T ∗ \{k} where k ∈ Jθ
∗
∩S (such a player464
exists by (26)). In this subcase, M ∩ S 6= ∅ since |S ∩ T ∗| ≥ 2 , M \ S 6= ∅465
since, by (30), S ∩ Jθ
∗
 Jθ
∗
, and S \M 6= ∅, by the hypothesis of case B.466
In both cases B.1 and B.2, M = T ∗ \ {k}, for some k ∈ Jθ
∗
. Thus, by (31), we467
are done.468
From both cases A and B, we have shown that x 6∈ C(N, v), but x ∈ SB(N, v),
getting a contradiction with the hypothesis C(N, v) = SB(N, v). ⊓⊔
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